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I. INTRODUCTION
n roughly the last ten years, video games have literally (and figura-
tively) skyrocketed in popularity and sophistication, from the early
simple "ping pong" style games to the more recent highly complex tech-
niques and graphics found in the many space-battle games. The expan-
sion of the industry has been accompanied by piracy and copying, espe-
cially of the most popular games.' The computer programs controlling the
games, which are usually encoded in microcircuit chips called ROMs, are
*The author gratefully acknowledges Michael H. Davis, Associate Professor of Law,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, for his advice during the
preparation of this Note, and Thomas G. Williams for his technical assistance in preparing
the manuscript. An abridged version of this Note received first prize in the 1983 Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and was submitted to
the national competition which is sponsored by the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers.
' See The Bandits Vs. the Lawyers, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 20, 1982, at 76.
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easily pirated by means of devices which can copy the ROMs directly.
Further, the tremendous popularity of a few games seems to have spurred
"copycats," who are developing games with similar, if not nearly identical,
sights and sounds.2 The result in the last few years has been a surge in
litigation over the games, for the most part involving claims of copyright
infringement.'
Video games have been described by one court as "computers program-
med to create on a television screen cartoons in which some of the action
is controlled by the player."" Like cartoons, the design of video games
requires considerable creative effort, and only those designers using the
best techniques for devising game strategies and graphics can produce
successful video games.' That effort also entails considerable expense.
Piracy, on the other hand, entails relatively little effort and expense. As a
result, there is a need for some form of protection for the efforts of game-
developers. It has been noted by industry officials that otherwise "high-
tech innovation is going to suffer, since computel wizards are not going to
produce new devices they can't protect."6
Copyright has proved to be an appropriate form of protection for video
games. However, the application of copyright law to protect the audiovi-
sual displays and underlying computer programs of video games has be-
come possible only since the revision of the Copyright Act 7 in 1976. Of
further significance to the ability to protect video games has been the
development of the law of copyright in the subject areas of computer pro-
grams, games, and characters. The status of copyright protection for
video games has been clarified somewhat by recent court decisions. The
nature of copyright law, however, is such that the final determination of
the protection to be afforded a given game actually rests on policy
grounds rather than on an application of black-letter law to facts. The
constitutional foundation of copyright law is the attempt to protect cer-
tain individual property rights while providing an incentive for produc-
tion of new works. Such a goal is achieved only through a delicate balanc-
ing of interests, and the extent of protection is based in each case on that
balance of policies. An understanding of the way in which that balance is
achieved in copyright for video games can be attained by first examining
' See id.
3 Id.
4 Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 853 (2d Cir. 1982).
' See Crawford, Design Techniques and Ideals for Computer Games, BYTE, Dec. 1982,
at 96-108, for a discussion of the techniques which have proved successful.
6 The Bandits Vs. the Lawyers, supra note 1, at 76. See Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983). "Few companies are going to invest
the time and resources to develop new programs if their products can be freely duplicated
by anyone." Id. at 783.
' Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. app.




the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of copyright law, and then
reviewing the development of copyright doctrines in the subject areas of
computer programs, games, and characters.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS: COPYRIGHT
A. Copyright Clause
The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[tlo promote the Pro-
gress of Science . . ., by securing for limited Times to Authors . . .the
exclusive Right to their . . .Writings . . . ."s Thus, Congress may grant
limited monopolies to "authors" for the purpose of promoting the pro-
gress of science.'. One rationale is that by securing authors' interests in
their works, an incentive is created to produce more writings and to dis-
tribute their works publicly. Limited protection is necessary to prevent
the grant of exclusive rights from foreclosing others from making full use
of the protected works, thus hindering, rather than promoting, the "pro-
gress of science."
Congress has exercised its power to grant copyrights in an increasingly
expanding way since 1790. Over the years, both increased statutory cover-
age and judicial interpretations have made it clear that the subject matter
amenable to copyright under the Constitution-that is, within the mean-
ing of "writings" of "authors"-is quite broad.10
Congress has never enacted a statute intended to be coextensive with
the copyright clause. The House Report on the 1976 revision of the Copy-
right Act 1 indicates a concern that the statute not extend to the constitu-
tional limits, because judicial interpretation may result in protection of
subject matter outside of Congress' intended scope or in exclusion from
subject matter of an area Congress might want to protect.'2
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The portion quoted is traditionally considered to consti-
tute the power to grant copyrights. The full clause including the power to grant patents
reads: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
Id.
, Note that "science" refers broadly to the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge
and information. In the sense used in the copyright clause, "science" is probably synony-
mous with the body of tangible works of authors. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.03, at 1-30 n.1 (1982).
10 For a discussion of statutory developments in copyright subject matter see CONTU,
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS 15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONTU REPORT]. For judicial interpretation of the
meaning of "writings" within the copyright clause, see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
561 (1973) (writings held to "include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellec-
tion or aesthetic labor") and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
" Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. app.
§§ 101-801 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
12 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5664 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
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B. The 1909 Act
Until Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1976, copyright law in the
United States was defined by the 1909 Act.1 The language of that Act,
with some accommodation, ' 4 was broad enough to encompass many of the
technological changes which occurred during the next six-and-a-half de-
cades. Under the 1909 Act, copyright protection was afforded for "all
writings of an author." 6 As previously noted, this clause was not in-
tended to reach the constitutional limits, although the language used is
similar.
Further, under the 1909 Act, federal statutory copyright was triggered
by publication of the work. 6 Prior to publication, perpetual common-law
rights subsisted in the works of an author. 7 The rationale for divesting
common-law rights by operation of the statute (upon publication) stems
from the constitutional policy reflected in the copyright clause of "secur-
ing protection for limited times," and from the notion that only the grant
of a limited monopoly can serve to "promote" the progress of science.' 8
C. The 1976 Act
In 1976, Congress passed the long-awaited revision of the Copyright
Act (the 1976 Act).' 9 In many areas, the 1976 Act sought to codify ex-
isting case law rather than to change the substantive law of copyright. °
However, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress was cogni-
zant of the expansion in science and technology which had occurred since
the enactment of the 1909 Act and attempted to accommodate some of
the new developments through the 1976 revision." Moreover, some of the
changes in the Act have in reality effected a revolution in the substantive
law of copyright. Features of the 1976 Act which are of particular signifi-
,3 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-
215 (1976)) (repealed 1976).
,4 Motion pictures were added as subject matter in 1912, and sound recordings in 1972.
CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 15.
" 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (repealed 1976).
For a general discussion, see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 4.01.
17 Note that common-law copyright subsists in perpetuity, whereas statutory copyright
is limited to a term of years (currently the lifetime of the author plus 50 years).
, See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 4.03.
Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. app.
§§ 101-801 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
20 See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5664 (the phrase "original works of authorship" used in the statute "was in-
tended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts
under the present copyright statute").
21 Id. Some of the technological changes occurring during the intervening years and
noted by Congress include the development of the sound-recording and motion-picture in-
dustries, and the emergence of electronic media, such as radio and television, electronic mu-




cance for the present discussion are the replacement of publication with
"fixation" as the event triggering statutory rights; the expanded defini-
tions of "fixation" and of "copies," which now include non-human-read-
able media; and the codification of the idea-expression dichotomy.
Subject matter for copyright under the 1976 Act includes "original
works of authorship 2 2 as contrasted with "all writings of an author," the
language used in the 1909 Act. Congress intended to avoid confusion as to
whether the Act was coextensive with the copyright clause of the Consti-
tution.2" Section 102 of the 1976 Act also provides a list of types of sub-
ject matter specifically intended to be included.2 4
One of the most significant changes in the 1976 Act is the codification
of the fixation requirement in the definition of subject matter. Under the
statute, "protection subsists. . . in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device. 2 1 While fixation was
a requirement under the Constitution and the 1909 Act, presumably be-
cause it was essential to "a writing, '2s the 1976 Act was intended to
broaden the scope of fixation by allowing for later-developed tangible me-
dia of expression. Congress specifically intended to prevent the type of
artificial distinctions made in White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 7
between media in which the work is directly perceptible by humans-for
example, the printed word-and media in which the work may not be
perceived directly.2 8 The White-Smith doctrine persisted in interpreta-
tions of copyright law until the enactment of the 1976 Act and served to
preclude protection for works which were not embodied in human-read-
able media. The abrogation of White-Smith was also effected in the defi-
nition of "copies" under the 1976 Act. Copies are defined in section 101
" 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
" See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
24 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979):
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
Note that the list is not exhaustive of possible categories of copyrightable subject matter.
" Id. (emphasis added).
" See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.03[B].
27 209 U.S. 1 (1908). The Court in White-Smith specifically refused to find that player-
piano rolls were copies of the underlying composition because the work could not be per-
ceived directly on a roll of paper with punched holes.
28 House REPORT, supra note 12, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5665. This distinction is generally referred to as the White-Smith doctrine.
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as "material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. "29
Furthermore, under the 1976 Act, fixation is the event which triggers
federal statutory rights.3 0 The 1976 Act makes clear that upon fixation of
the work, all common-law copyrights are preempted by the statute." The
preemption provision effectively abolishes nearly all common-law
copyright.
3 2
The 1976 Act also codifies the long-recognized principle that copyright
protection will be afforded only for expressions of ideas and not for the
ideas themselves.3 3 The House Report indicated that the intent of section
102(b) was to restate the existing dichotomy between idea and expression
and not to expand or contract the scope of copyright in any way.34 The
idea-expression dichotomy in copyright is important not only in deter-
mining whether a given work is copyrightable subject matter, as its treat-
ment in section 102 would indicate, but it is also essential in determining
where lawful copying ends and unlawful misappropriation begins. More-
over, the copyright clause probably mandates the distinction. The extent
to which a given work is protected will depend on the degree to which it
is an original expression of ideas rather than merely the necessary or in-
evitable embodiment of the idea itself.
3 5
Prior to passage of the 1976 Act, Congress was concerned about chang-
19 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
30 Under the 1909 Act, publication triggered statutory rights. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
31 17 U.S.C. app. § 301 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
32 Common-law rights may still subsist in works which are not fixed or recorded simulta-
neously, such as live performances, broadcasts, or unwritten speeches. Further, the fact of
federal preemption extends only to "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
. .. 17 U S.C. app. § 301(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Thus a state may in theory provide
greater rights to authors of original fixed works than those provided under the statute. See
id. § 301(b)(3).
33 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979): "In no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." This section also appears to
distinguish copyright subject matter from that of patent, which includes processes as well as
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). However, as
in copyright, bare ideas are not patentable subject matter.
34 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 56-57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5670.
35 As a result, the fewer the possible variations in expression of an idea, the less likely it
is that a given expression will be afforded protection. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). This aspect of the idea-expression dichot-




ing technology and its impact in the area of copyright.36 In 1974, Congress
established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study and make legislative recommen-
dations on computer uses, computer-assisted creation of copyrighted
works, and other issues related to the impact of computers on copyright.3 7
Because CONTU was still in the midst of its work when the 1976 Act was
passed, Congress enacted section 117 to maintain the status quo in copy-
right law vis-A-vis computers and computer programs.38 The final report
of CONTU was completed in 1978,3' and its recommendations were es-
sentially embodied in the 1980 amendment to the Act.40 The 1980 amend-
ments added a definition of "computer programs" to the definitions of
section 101.4' Section 117 of the 1976 Act was replaced by a new section
limiting the exclusive rights afforded authors of computer programs, by
allowing owners of copies of computer programs to make copies where
essential to the utilization or maintenance of the program.4 2 By adopting
statutory provisions nearly identical to those recommended by CONTU,4 3
Congress implicitly adopted all of the CONTU recommendations."' While
it was evident that Congress believed a computer program to be copy-
rightable under the 1909 Act, at least insofar as it was an expression and
not merely a process, 5 the 1980 amendments and subsequent application
s See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
3 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 701 note (Supp. III 1979)).
38 17 U.S.C. app. § 117 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (repealed 1980). See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 12, at 116, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5731. The status quo
was by no means clear at this point. In 1964, the Copyright Office began accepting registra-
tion of computer programs as books. The programs of course had to be works of original
authorship, and in keeping with the doctrine of White-Smith, copies had to be visually
perceptible and in an intelligible language. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; 1
M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.04[c], at 2-43-44. Congress apparently believed that com-
puter programs were in fact copyrightable under the 1909 Act as indicated in the House
Report discussion on § 102. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5664.
s CONTU REPORT, supra note 10.
40 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 7, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (Supp. IV 1980)). See CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 12, for the
text of the recommendations.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980): "A computer program is a set of statements or in-
structions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result."
412 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
'" The only difference was the use of the term "owner of a copy" in § 117 instead of
CONTU's recommended "rightful possessor of a copy." CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at
12.
" See H.R. REPORT No. 1037, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482. The report states that the bill "embodies the [CONTU]
recommendations." Id.
"' See supra note 38.
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of the requirements of the 1976 Act46 to computer programs have done
much to clarify the issue.
III. CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE COURTS:
ANALOGOUS SUBJECT MATTER
A. Computer Programs
The status of copyright in computer programs has not been litigated
extensively in the courts. Since the Copyright Office began accepting re-
gistrations of computer programs in 1964,"' there has been a near-revolu-
tion in the computer industry with respect to available hardware and a
resultant change in the demand for software. 48 The lack of copyright liti-
gation may be attributable to the adequacy of other forms of protection
generally relied on by software producers, such as trade secret, contrac-
tual and license restrictions, and actions for unfair competition and mis-
40 Section 117 of the 1976 Act, in preserving the status quo vis-a-vis computer programs,
arguably precluded application of the new definition of "copies" to computer programs, thus
extending the White-Smith doctrine in that area, although Congress expressly ended the
requirement of "human readability" of copies by application of the 1976 Act in other areas.
See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8.08, at 8-103 n.4. However, the alternative view is that
the 1976 version of § 117, by its language, only limited the application of §§ 106-118 to
computer programs under the 1976 Act, the provisions merely defining the scope of exclu-
sive rights granted. Thus, the "new" definitions of "fixation" and of "copy" arguably ap-
plied to computer programs upon passage of the 1976 Act. This view is supported by the
House Report discussion of § 117, stating: "With respect to copyrightability of computer
programs, the ownership of copyrights in them, the term of protection ... the new statute
would apply." HoUsE REPORT, supra note 12, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5731. Additionally, it would seem inconsistent to allow fixation in any tangible
form to trigger statutory rights in computer programs under the 1976 Act, yet not apply the
new definition of "copy" (essentially any tangible form in which a work is fixed). Otherwise,
the old definition of "copy" would preclude any rights, either statutory or common law, in a
computer program fixed in a medium in which the work is not visually perceptible. Cf. 2
M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8.08, at 8-108.1-.2. The repeal of the 1976 version of § 117 and
enactment of an entirely different § 117 discussing only "limitations on exclusive rights"
clarifies the matter by negatively implying that otherwise all provisions of the 1976 Act now
apply to computer programs.
47 See supra note 38.
48 "Hardware" refers generally to the computer itself and peripheral devices for input
and output, etc.-in short, the "hard-wired" or permanent aspects of a computer system.
"Software" refers generally to computer programs which control the functional operation of
the system but are not really a permanent part of it. The distinction has been somewhat
blurred by the recent development of semiconductor integrated circuit chips known as
ROMs ("read only memory"). ROMs are imprinted with computer programs which form a
relatively permanent part of the computer system. Some ROMs are manufactured with the
program, others are programmable (PROMs), and some may be erased and reprogrammed
(EPROMs). These ROMs have been termed "firmware" because they appear to fall some-





appropriation."' However, the changes which have occurred in the com-
puter industry, particularly the wide availability of inexpensive hardware,
the development of semiconductor chips (ROMs),5 0 and the ease with
which ROMs may be copied, have both expanded the market for software
and resulted in its widespread public distribution and use. 5' Therefore,
the alternative forms of protection promoted by Commissioner Hersey of
CONTU 52 and others may no longer be adequate." It is this relatively
recent upsurge in the need for copyright protection which may account
for the paucity of reported cases to date. Additionally, it might be ex-
pected that the clarification of the status of copyright for computer pro-
grams provided by the 1976 Act and the 1980 amendments will encourage
authors of computer programs to take advantage of that form of
protection.
1. The CONTU Recommendations
Some discussion of the findings and recommendations of CONTU is
helpful in gaining an understanding of cases examining the
copyrightability of computer programs. CONTU identified some general
objectives in the development of its recommendations for statutory
change:
To provide reasonable protection for proprietors without unduly
burdening users of programs and the general public, the following
statements concerning program copyright ought to be true:
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of
these works.
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these
works.
3. Copyright should not block the development and dissemina-
tion of these works.
4. Copyright should not grant anyone more economic power
4" See, e.g., CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 30-31 (dissent of Comm'r Hersey). Her-
sey contended that copyright protection for computer programs was unnecessary because
other forms were sufficient. Commissioner Hersey is a novelist and journalist and, at the
time the report was issued, was president of the Author's League of America. Id. at 107
app.(e).
o See supra note 48.
6 For a discussion of these developments and market trends, see Root, Protecting Com-
puter Software in the 80's: Practical Guidelines for Evolving Needs, 8 RUTrGEsS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 205, 209-13 (1981).
"' See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 16-18; Maggs, Computer Programs as the
Object of Intellectual Property in the United States of America, 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 251,
252 (Supp. 1982) ("because of the need to maintain secrecy. . . trade secrets are unsuitable
for the protection of mass-marketed software"); Root, supra note 51, at 225-29.
1983-84]
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than is necessary to achieve the incentive to create."'
CONTU's objectives restate some fundamental policies behind copyright
law. CONTU's finding of the need for copyright protection for computer
programs was based in part on the fact that development of computer
programs costs far more than their duplication. Given that the creator
will bear the expense of the development, such cost must be recovered
either entirely on the first sale or over sale of multiple copies, assuming
that some protection is available against unauthorized duplication. The
former alternative would result in prohibitive costs; thus the latter seems
more reasonable if the aim is to encourage creation.58
CONTU, however, also recognized some constraints created by the
Constitution, the statute, and judicial interpretation. The Commission
pointed out that Congress viewed programs as copyrightable under the
1909 Act"0 and as literary works within the meaning of the 1976 Act.
5 7
Under the 1976 Act, a computer program is copyrighted" if it is an "orig-
inal work of authorship," upon its "[fixation] in any tangible medium of
expression. '9"
The requirement presenting the most problems for computer programs
under the scheme of the 1976 Act is that of a "work of authorship."0 The
Act codified a limitation on works to be copyrighted by precluding pro-
tection of ideas, procedures and processes, and the like."1 Congress stated
CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
5 Id. at 11.
" Id. at 15.
" Id. at 16. "The term 'literary works' does not connote any criterion of literary merit or
qualitative value.. .. It ... includes computer data bases, and computer programs to the
extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as
distinguished from the ideas themselves." HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 54, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 5667. Note also the statutory definition: 'Literary
works' are works other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers or other verbal
or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied." 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
" Note that the work is in fact "copyrighted" and not just "copyrightable" upon fixation
because the limits of subject matter under § 102 and the triggering of statutory rights under
§ 301 are both defined by fixation. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 102(a), 301 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
See CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 18.
" 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
"The originality requirement mandates that the program be created by the author and
not copied from another work. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 18. The fixation
requirement under the broad definition of the 1976 Act may create some problems, but
generally seems easy to meet given the possibility of any media "now known or later devel-
oped." 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Any problems which arise are proba-
bly in the interpretation of the words "from which [works] can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated." Id. The language may bear on the definition of a work of author-
ship vis-A-vis computer programs.




that "section 102(b) is intended . . .to make clear that the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer
program, and the actual processes or methods embodied in the program
are not within the scope of the copyright law."'6 2 CONTU interpreted the
section to codify the rule of Baker v. Selden,"3 that a copyrighted descrip-
tion of a system does not preclude use of the system by unauthorized
persons.
6 4
CONTU pointed to two limitations on the ability to copyright which
have provided some guidance to the courts.65 The first limitation seems to
be that some minimum effort is probably required, i.e., that the program
must be "the fruits of intellectual labor."" This notion should not be con-
fused with the patent law requirement of nonobviousness6 The limita-
tion is better understood as reiterating that there must be some form of
original expression by the author, so that subject matter which does not
appear to be creative will not be copyrightable unless it reflects at least
some minimal effort.6" A second limitation stems from the idea-expres-
sion dichotomy. CONTU termed this "the 'idea-expression identity' ex-
ception."69 No protection will be afforded an expression which is one of a
very few ways to express an idea. Where the alternative ways to express
an idea are few, the idea and its expression are nearly one and the same.
Thus, to provide protection for the expression would, in effect, block
nearly all use of the idea.7 0
The limitations do not erect serious obstacles in most instances. Very
few programs are so simple as not to embody sufficient original expres-
sion or creative effort of the authors.7 1 Moreover, most complex computer
processes are capable of expression in a program in a myriad of ways. The
chief limitation on copyright protection under the 1976 Act is likely to be
the fact that no protection will be afforded the processes used, however
complex or creative. In no event will simple algorithms be protected,
"2 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5670 (emphasis added).
63 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (copyright of book describing an accounting system did not grant
the author exclusive rights to the use of the system).
CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.
"0 Id. at 20. CONTU sees the two limitations as distinct. However, they are probably just
two criteria for evaluating the broader question of what is an idea and what is an expression
in the context of the policy behind copyright. The broad question becomes: what can be
protected from infringement without blocking too much from use by others and thus stifling
competition?
Id. (citing Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)).
', See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
For example, a telephone book is not creative, but may be copyrighted because some
effort is required to produce such a compilation.
69 CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 20.
70 See id. for a general discussion.
7, Such programs are unlikely to require copyright protection, at any rate.
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since, even if they were not precluded as subject matter per se,72 they
would nevertheless fail as being merely ideas.7" Only the expression of the
processes, embodied in the ordering of statements and steps in some pro-
gram language, will be protectable even though the development of the
processes constituted the major effort.7' In a sense, this is no more harsh
a requirement than is placed on any author. Very often it is the author's
formulation of ideas which represents the greatest portion of the entire
effort, and the embodiment in an expressive form is a much lesser one.
Commissioner Hersey of CONTU did not agree with the recommenda-
tions or the analysis concerning the copyrightability of computer pro-
grams.78 The dissent focused on what it termed "mature programs"-that
is, programs in machine-usable form, usually expressed in "object code."
Hersey contended that "mature programs" do not communicate to
humans, but at most to machines. Moreover, the machine-control phase
of the program becomes in fact a part of the machine. Mature programs
perform the mechanical work but do not give instructions. Thus, the dis-
sent maintained that such programs should not be copyrightable "on con-
stitutional grounds and for reasons of social policy. 17 6 Furthermore, the
dissent asserted that copyright protection for computer programs is not
needed. The argument is that other forms of protection, such as trade
secret, licensing agreements, patent and unfair competition law, are suffi-
cient, and wherever they are not, legislation specifically tailored to the
area could be enacted.
7
To the extent that the output of a computer program expresses its con-
tent, the CONTU dissenting objection to copyright in mature programs
seems unfounded, because the program would in fact communicate with
the human user.78 Such an idea may have been the basis for Commis-
sioner Nimmer's concurrence, which suggested that perhaps only pro-
grams "which produce works which themselves qualify for copyright pro-
72 See 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
78 Algorithms are left essentially unprotected by either patent or copyright, while novel
and inventive processes of computer programs are potentially patentable. See Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
7" Note that program designs and flow charts are also copyrightable. Further, the pro-
gram should be protected from being copied into other program languages because those
uses constitute translations and are thus derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101, 106
(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
78 See generally CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 27-37. Commissioner Karpatken
concurred with Commissioner Hersey's dissent. Id. at 37-38.
76 Id. at 27.
77 Id. at 30-31. But see supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
78 See Koenig, Software Copyright: The Conflict Within CONTU, 27 BULL CoPYIGwr
Soc'Y 340, 364-66 (1980). Examples of such programs might be those which generate tables
of data in a determined format and compiler programs which produce error messages after




tection" should be protected.7 9 However, programs the output of which is
content-expressive and programs which produce copyrightable works are
not categories which are coextensive and Commissioner Nimmer's distinc-
tion is probably artificial at best.80
Regarding the remainder of mature programs, no expression of which is
embodied in their output, Commissioner Hersey's objection that copy-
right protection is dehumanizing, because it equates human beings with
machines, would seem to apply. Regardless, it is not unquestionably clear
that the Constitution requires that only writings which communicate to
humans may be copyrighted. The CONTU majority relied on the fact
that a machine-usable form of a program may be converted into a
human-readable form." The issue is perhaps more logically resolved by
noting that the two opinions were based on fundamentally different
points of view. Commissioner Hersey's viewpoint is essentially a "use-ori-
ented" one-that is, the end result must be communication to and use by
humans. In contrast, the majority's point of view is author-oriented, find-
ing that the program in any form "embod[ies] the programmer's expres-
sion."8 As long as there is a human author, under this view, it should
make no difference to whom (or to what) the expression is made.
The dissent's insistence that the program becomes a part of the ma-
chine and is at most only patentable ignores the fact that while a com-
puter is a machine, it is fundamentally different from the kinds of ma-
chines to which patent has historically been applied. Under the
traditional view, machines perform mechanical functions which substitute
for the physical labor of humans or animals. Computers, while undoubt-
edly physically functioning machines, perform what is essentially the in-
tellectual labor of humans. Most machines might be viewed as "work"
machines.83 A computer program in conjunction with a computer could be
viewed as an "information" machine or an "information-processing" ma-
chine. Accordingly, it is not surprising that machine-usable programs
have presented such a conceptual problem in the area of intellectual
property protection since they are, in many ways, unlike any other forms
of expression and unlike any other machines.
2. Copyrightability of Machine Programs:
Judicial Interpretation
Notwithstanding that programs were apparently copyrightable under
the 1909 Act, that Congress clearly intended to include programs under
79 CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 27.
80 See Koenig, supra note 78, at 357.
81 CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 21.
0' Koenig, supra note 78, at 358.
8 "Work" is used in the sense of producing physical changes in something.
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the 1976 Act, and that Congress adopted CONTU's recommendations, 4
the status of machine-usable programs was uncertain in the courts until
recently. The fires of dispute generated by the CONTU majority and dis-
senting opinions arguably were fanned rather than extinguished by some
courts' interpretations of the 1976 Act and 1980 amendments.
The controversy over the copying of ROMs (semiconductor chips con-
taining machine programs)85 appears to have begun in Data Cash Sys-
tems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.s6 Data Cash Systems was decided under
the 1976 Act prior to the enactment of the 1980 amendments. 87 The dis-
trict court's opinion is significant primarily for its dicta regarding the sta-
tus of ROMs under the 1976 Act.88 In a lengthy footnote the district court
indicated that "[e]ven if the 1976 Act did apply, copying of the ROM
would not be actionable."8 9 The court recognized that under the 1976 Act
"copies" need not be visually perceptible directly, but found that the
1976 Act did not apply to computer programs in their object-code phase.
The court found significant" the fact that the ROM or a program in its
object phase was a "mechanical device" which is an "essential part of the
mechanical process" of the computer.9 1 The court viewed the mechanical
devices as not subject to copyright unless they were pictorial, graphic, or
" See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 48. ROMs contain "mature programs" in the sense used by Commis-
sioner Hersey-that is, they are in machine or "object" code form. Additionally, ROMs are
generally among the more permanent aspects of the functioning machine, while software is
inputted from tape, disk, cards, etc.
480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. IlI. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980).
81 The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied the
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on the issue of copyright infringement of a
ROM chip containing a program for the plaintiff's hand-held computer chess game. The
court interpreted § 117 of the 1976 Act as requiring application of the 1909 Act or common
law in the area of computer programs. 480 F. Supp. at 1069. But see supra note 46. Al-
though both plaintiff and defendants had assumed that ROMs were "copies" and had ad-
dressed their arguments to the issues of when publication occurred, whether the 1909 or
1976 Act was applicable, and whether notice was defective, the district court found the issue
of whether the ROM was a "copy" of the work to be dispositive. Finding that ROMs were
not copies under either common-law copyright or the 1909 Act, the court held that the
defendants had a complete defense as a matter of law and granted summary judgement. 480
F. Supp. at 1069.
Id. at 1066-67 n.4.
a Id. at 1066 n.4.
10 Another reason stated by the court referred to proposed regulations regarding the af-
fixing of notice to such works reproduced in machine-readable copies. No explanation was
given and it is unclear how the quoted regulations offer any negative inference about the
applicability of the 1976 Act to object-code programs. In fact, it appears to the con-
trary-that a reasonable method to allow for notice on such programs is found in the regula-






Data Cash Systems was affirmed in the court of appeals on entirely
different grounds.98 The basis of the appellate decision was that publica-
tion had occurred prior to January 1, 19789" by the public sale of more
than 2,500 units containing the ROM without restriction or notice of
copyright. The plaintiff had thus forfeited his statutory rights under the
1909 Act by placing the work in the public domain.9 5 While the court of
appeals expressly declined to decide the issue of whether the ROM was a
copy under the 1976 Act, the decision implies that in fact the court
viewed it as such. The court cited the language of the 1909 Act regarding
publication which refers to the distribution of "copies."' 6 Thus, by find-
ing that "publication" within the meaning of the 1909 Act had occurred,
the court must have viewed as "copies" the ROMs inside the games which
were distributed.' 7
More recently, the view of the district court in Data Cash Systems was
rejected in Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc." Tandy in-
volved a motion to dismiss a claim of copyright infringement for copying
the plaintiff's home computer" input-output routine, which was stored in
a ROM in the computer. The district court held that the program was a
"work of authorship" and the ROM chip was a "tangible medium of ex-
pression" within the meaning of sections 101 and 102 of the 1976 Act; 0
92 Id.
93 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). In fact, the parties on appeal did not address the issue
of whether the ROM was a copy, but concentrated on the issue of whether the plaintiff had
forefeited statutory copyright by publication without notice. Thus, the court of appeals did
not consider the issue relied upon by the lower court.
9, That point marked the effective date of the 1976 Act.
9' Defect in notice would not be so damning under the 1976 Act because the new statute
provides liberal opportunities for cure.
628 F.2d at 1042.
' For a discussion of the problems raised by § 117 of the 1976 Act, see supra note 46.
The district court was probably correct in assuming that ROMs are not copies under the
1909 Act in light of the Act's apparent approval of the White-Smith doctrine. See supra
notes 27-28 and accompanying text. If the court of appeals found that publication occurred
prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act, then the 1909 Act should apply. However, if the
1909 Act applied, there was no publication because the ROMs distributed were not copies.
Accordingly, common-law rights would have been applicable, but probably would not pro-
hibit copying of the ROM. The district court's assumption of the inapplicability of any as-
pect of the 1976 Act by virtue of § 117, assuming publication occurred after January 1,
1978, is probably incorrect for reasons previously noted. See supra note 46. Arguably, the
1976 Act's definition of "copies" would apply and the court of appeals was correct in assum-
ing ROMs are copies. However, that leaves open the question of whether the notice provi-
sions of the 1909 Act or of the 1976 Act apply. The case is a good example of the gray area
left by the enactment of § 117 of the 1976 Act, prior to the 1980 amendments.
98 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
99 Tandy Corporation makes the Radio Shack TRS-80 home computer, one of the least
expensive and best selling personal computers.524 F. Supp. at 173. Although the case was decided after the 1980 amendments were
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thus the work was copyrighted. The defendant's contention that section
117 of the 1976 Act made only the 1909 Act applicable to computer pro-
grams was rejected by the court on two grounds. First, the court found
that section 117 did not, on its face, apply to sections 101 and 102.10' The
court noted the logical inconsistency in finding programs fixed in non-
eye-readable form to be copyrighted under section 102 and finding the
medium of fixation not protected as a copy.10 2 Second, the court inter-
preted former section 117 as concerned only with problems associated
with inputting copyrighted materials into computers, since it refers to the
use of works "in conjunction with" systems. 10 3 "It was not intended to
provide a loophole by which someone could duplicate a computer pro-
gram fixed on a silicon chip."'" Moreover, the court expressly rejected
the reasoning of Data Cash Systems. 0 5
The approach of Tandy concerning the copyrightability of ROMs
under the 1976 Act was much sounder than that of Data Cash Systems.
Presumably the repeal in 1980 of the former section 117 and Congress'
complete adoption of the CONTU recommendations'"s should have ended
the controversy, at least as to claims arising after the amendments. Nev-
ertheless, the controversy continued with the district court decision in
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.07 Apple v. Franklin
enacted, they were inapplicable to the case.
101 Id. at 174 (citing the Housa REPORT, supra note 12).
I" See supra note 46 for a discussion of the problems posed by the 1976 Act. See further
the discussion of Data Cash Systems supra note 97. Note that the presence of inconsis-
tency could lead to either of two conclusions: that former § 117 was meant to exclude com-
puter programs entirely from the operation of the 1976 Act; or that the section was meant
only to maintain whatever exclusive rights existed previously, pending the findings of
CONTU. It is not clear that the second alternative actually would result in any difference in
protection for computer programs than would complete applicability of the 1976 Act. The
new definitions of "fixation" and "copy" under the 1976 Act have the greatest impact in
expanding the ability to copyright and the degree of protection for computer programs be-
cause they abrogate the White-Smith doctrine. Assuming that § 117 did not preclude the
application of those requirements set forth in §§ 101 and 102, the 1976 Act necessarily ex-
panded the scope of protection afforded computer programs notwithstanding the former§ 117.
108 524 F. Supp. at 174.
104 Id. at 175. The court continued: "Such a duplication of a chip is not the use of a
copyrighted program 'in conjunction with' a computer; it is simply the copying of a chip.
Moreover, any other interpretation would render the theoretical ability to copyright com-
puter programs meaningless." Id. (emphasis in original).
'" For a case which followed Tandy and also expressly declined to follow Data Cash
Systems, see GCA Corp. v. Chance, 2 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) (1982 Copyright L. Decs.)
25,464 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1982). In an action for infringement of a copyrighted source
code through the copying of the object code the court stated: "Because the object code is the
encryption of the copyrighted source code, the two are to be treated as one work; therefore,
copyright of the source code protects the object code as well." Id. at 17,765.
'" See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.




was an action for copyright infringement in which it was alleged that the
defendant had copied the plaintiff's operating system for its personal
computers.10 8 However, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, finding that there was no reasonable probability of
success on the merits.
The district court's reasoning is obscure, but the decision appears to be
based on the court's conclusions that there was no clear intent on the
part of Congress to copyright object programs and ROMs under the cur-
rent Copyright Act'0 9 and that encoded ROMs may not be copyrighted as
three-dimensional objects.110 While the court admitted the plausibility of
the plaintiff's position that the operating system is a form of expression
constituting a work of authorship and that the ROMs or floppy disks in
which it is fixed are tangible media of expression,1 it appears to have
misconstrued the status of the law vis-a-vis computer programs. The
court did not acknowledge that Congress adopted the recommendations
of the CONTU majority when it enacted the 1980 amendments.""'
Rather, the court focused on the dissent of Commissioner Hersey and in
fact appears to have adopted that view."8 Apparently its findings were
based on a misconceived notion of the meaning of "fixation" and of
"copy" under the 1976 Act. The ROM is a "copy" of the object program
as a "material object ... in which [the] work is fixed by any method...
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated . . .with the aid of a machine or device. 11' 4 The making of
ROMs, either from a list of the object code or by actually copying the
ROM itself onto a PROM (a programmable ROM), is the making of a
"copy" of the program within the meaning of the 1976 Act, no less than
videotaping a television program is copying the program.15
I" The "operating system" is a group of programs which control the operation of the
computer. Its functions include: handling input and output; execution of programs; control-
ling the flow of information within all devices which make up the system; and even deter-
mining which operating system program is executed at any given time. Apple v. Franklin
involved a claim of copyright infringement of 14 programs making up the operating system
for the Apple II computer. The programs, all in object code, were imprinted either in ROMs
or inscribed on floppy disks. The defendant, Franklin, manufactured a personal computer
similar to Apple's computer. Apple and others also produced a number of highly marketable
software packages which were compatible only with Apple's computer and operating system.
The defendant claimed to have designed a system to be "compatible with the Apple-com-
patible software" and which was inevitably similar to the Apple system. Id. at 815.
109 Id. at 817-20. The current act includes the 1980 amendments.
110 Id. at 822-24.
- Id. at 819-20.
"I See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
113 See 545 F. Supp. at 821 n.14, 824-25.
"' 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The analogy would extend also to taping records or live performances, but since "cop-
ies" are distinguished from "phonorecords" under the 1976 Act, that analogy may create
some confusion.
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Consequent to its failure to see the ROM as a copy of the program, the
district court was unnecessarily preoccupied with the issue of the
copyrightability of the topography of the ROM as a three-dimensional
object. A concern with the topography of the chip essentially begs the
question of whether the object programs constituting the operating sys-
tem will be protected. Encoded on the chip is information reflecting the
intellectual labor of the author, which may or may not be a work of au-
thorship subject to copyright.'1 6 Under the 1976 Act and Congress' rejec-
tion of the White-Smith doctrine,'"7 it would not be suggested that a pi-
ano roll would be the fixation or copy through which the pattern of holes
per se is protected, although that may be possible. Rather, the piano roll
is a copy of the underlying musical work fixed in the pattern of holes,
which can be reproduced by the aid of the player piano. While the pat-
tern of printed words on a page may be in principle copyrightable, the
printed words are more accurately a "copy" of the author's "literary
work."""
Three days after the district court decision in Apple v. Franklin, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit made clear in Wil-
liams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc."9 that programs em-
bodied in ROMs were copyrightable under the 1976 Act.'" Consequently,
Apple v. Franklin was later reversed on appeal to the Third Circuit. " '
The court found no basis for a distinction between source code and object
code under copyright law.'22 Furthermore, the status of ROMs as "cop-
ies" within the meaning of the 1976 Act was reaffirmed.' Finally, in re-
sponse to objections that the operating systems themselves were un-
copyrightable processes or ideas, the court upheld the copyright of the
programs as instructions rather than processes."2 4 The court found that if
the operating system idea was "capable of various modes of expres-
sion, "'2 Apple's systems were appropriately protected by copyright.
Whether it is in fact a copyrightable work of authorship is of course subject to the
requirements of originality and sufficient expression.
,, See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
"8 See HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 53:
[A] "book" is not a work of authorship but is a particular kind of "copy." .
[T]he author may write a "literary work" which ... can be embodied in a wide
range of "copies"... including books ... [and] computer punch cards .... The
two essential elements-original work and tangible object-must merge through
fixation in order to produce subject matter copyrightable under the statute.
.. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
"o Williams involved copyright for programs which control a video game.
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1247.
"s Id. at 1249.
I. ld. at 1251. Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (description of accounting system
copyrightable, but system itself was not).
"' 714 F.2d at 1253. Cf. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th




The court of appeals decision in Apple v. Franklin may well have laid
to rest the controversy over the copyrightability of object programs en-
coded on ROMs. Courts in other circuits have declined to follow the ob-
scure reasoning of the district court in Apple v. Franklin. In Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,'2 6 the court reviewed the
legislative history and the CONTU REPORT, concluding "that Congress
. . .did not intend to make any distinction between 'programs which are
used in the production of further copyrighted works' and the those which
embody 'a system for the operation of a machine.' """ The court noted
that according copyright protection to Apple for the programs was in
keeping with public policy considerations. Furthermore, allowing the de-
fendant to use and market the expressions without the same investment
of money and time that had been involved in the plaintiff's development
of the programs "would hinder, not promote, competition and innovation
in the computer market"12 8 by making such developments economically
unfeasible. Insofar as the development of computer programs generally
does not differ from the creation of computer programs for video games,
the same policy considerations will apply.
B. Games
Copyright protection for games is closely tied to the idea-expression
dichotomy. Those aspects of games which reflect merely the idea of the
game have not been afforded copyright protection, 29 while those aspects
of a game which contain sufficient original expression are in principle
copyrightable. 8 0 In Whist Club v. Foster,"1 ' the court stated that "[iln
the conventional laws or rules of a game, as distinguished from the forms
or modes of expression in which they may be stated, there can be no liter-
ary property susceptible of copyright."' 3 2 Thus, the courts have estab-
lished the principle that the rules of a game are not per se copyrightable,
although an author's particular expression of the rules may be. The de-
gree of protection which can be afforded the author's particular expres-
sion of game rules is further limited by the number of possible variations
in expression of the subject matter. " In Chamberlin v. Uris Sales
able because merely an idea).
1"6 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
117 Id. at 782.
128 Id. at 783.
"I See Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945); Morrissey v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 262 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass. 1967); Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F.2d 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.18[H][3].
110 See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.18[H][3].
.. 42 F.2d 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (infringement action for publication of a rule book on
auction bridge).
, Id. at 782.
Il See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of this principle as ap-
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Corp., the court noted that the similarity in the rules of two games
resulted from their derivation from the same source and not from the
copying of plaintiff's language. Further, Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble
Co."3 6 emphasized the significance of the degree of variation inherently
possible in the subject matter. No creative authorship was found in a
sweepstakes entry-form rule which elicited information which was "sub-
stantially the same information that anyone conducting [such] a game or
sweepstakes . ..would perforce be required to elicit from a would-be
contestant." ' The court found the applicable principle to be whether the
similarity was "necessary" because the idea used was the same. 3 7
While games, insofar as they are merely the processes underlying their
rules, may not be copyrightable per se, there are aspects of games which
in principle should be copyrightable. Professor Nimmer suggests that,
among other aspects, the "pattern or design of game boards" are copy-
rightable as pictorial or graphic works or as maps.' Chamberlin implic-
itly supports the notion that game boards are copyrightable in its holding
that there was no infringement of the plaintiff's game board because the
portion that was copied was not original to the plaintiff, and therefore
not protected by the plaintiff's copyright.' Durham Industries v. Tomy
Corp.1'0 supports the susceptibility to copyright of graphic or sculptural
aspects of games. The court rejected a claim of infringement because the
only aspects of the game which were copied were the mechanical and util-
itarian features even though the games were "mechanically identical and
structurally similar."' The court reasoned that those aspects of the
games which were "decoration," "aesthetic," or "sculptural" features were
copyrighted but were not infringed. 42
While courts have not routinely afforded substantial (if any) copyright
protection to games, the decisions are best understood as congruent with
the general principles of copyright law that limit protection to expres-
sions of ideas rather than the ideas themselves. Thus, there is no reason
plied by CONTU to the area of computer programs.
134 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945) (action for infringement of plaintiff's copyrighted Acy-
Ducy game).
'36 262 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass. 1967) (action for infringement of plaintiff's sweepstakes
game contest rules).
Id. at 738.
Id. (quoting Gaye v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mass 1958)).
8 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.18[H][3], at 2-213 (citing Copyright Office Circular 17
(Dec. 1961) for the proposition that game boards are copyrightable). Nimmer also suggests
that labels for games and designs of playing cards should be copyrightable. The ability to
copyright is of course subject to the requirement of originality, and protection could only be
afforded to the expressive aspects of the design.
I'l 150 F.2d at 513.
"0 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 914.




to suggest that the otherwise-copyrightable aspects of games, such as the
particular way in which rules are expressed, the pictorial or graphic as-
pects of the game materials, or the non-functional sculptural aspects of
the game, may not be protected simply because games are not generally
thought to be copyrightable.
C. Characters
Character protection encompasses two areas of concern: characters as
copyrightable subject matter and the scope of protection which is ac-
corded to characters under copyright law." 8 Both issues are inextricably
tied to the idea-expression dichotomy, especially in the realm of character
copyright. Judicial interpretations have substantially clarified the dis-
cernment of idea and expression in the context of copyright, as well as
the proper test for infringement." In the area of character copyright, a
distinction has been made between literary characters which are created
primarily through "word portraits" and cartoon or other graphic charac-
ters which are created through visual representation, actions, and person-
ality.' 15 Professor Nimmer suggests that "[a] character is most readily
protectable where both the original work and the copied work consist of
cartoons or other graphic representations rather than 'word portraits.' "146
The present discussion focuses on cartoon or other visually represented
characters.
Copyright in cartoon characters was recognized in King Features Syn-
dicate v. Fleischer,"17 where the defendant's toy horse was held to be an
infringement of the plaintiff's copyrighted cartoon character horse. The
significance of the decision lies in its finding that a three-dimensional fig-
ure could infringe a copyrighted illustration of a character. The copyright
in the character is not limited to illustrations which copy the original."4 8
Copying the "attributes and antics" of a comic-book character was found
to constitute infringement in Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publica-
tions, Inc.'" The court stated: "So far as the pictorial representations
and verbal descriptions of 'Superman' are not a mere delineation of a
benevolent Hercules, but embody an arrangement of incidents and liter-
ary expressions original with the author, they are proper subjects of copy-
"4' See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.12, at 2-169.
Il Of particular significance is Sid & Marty Kroffts Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), discussed infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
'45 See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.12, at 2-173.
I' Id. (citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
147 299 F. 553 (2d Cir. 1924).
148 See also Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934)
(infringement found where the defendants made a doll of the plaintiff's character "Betty
Boop").
... 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
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right. . . ." The idea-expression distinction thus emerges as the central
issue in character copyright.
The opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp.""1 confirmed the copyrightability of characters generally, including
that of literary characters. " The opinion further described an idea-ex-
pression continuum and acknowledged the difficulty in drawing a divid-
ing line between the two concepts:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never ex-
tended. . . .Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary and
nobody ever can.168
To the extent that the expression of a character is barely more than the
idea of the character itself, no protection can be afforded. The determina-
tive criterion for copyright protection of characters, whether in the liter-
ary realm or in visually represented forms, appears to be the distinctive-
ness with which they are delineated. "[T]he less developed the characters,
the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear
for making them too indistinctly. '"' Cartoon characters, by virtue of
their visual representation, may be more easily copyrightable since they
are more likely to be distinctive. The addition of attributes such as the
character's "antics" further delineates the character so as to expand the
scope of copyright protection beyond the mere copying of the visual
representation.
160 Id. at 435.
1 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (action by playwright against motion-picture maker for
infringement of plaintiff's plot).
182 See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.12, at 2-170.
'6' 45 F.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
18 Id. The quoted passage was immediately preceded by Judge Hand's frequently cited
statement concerning the ability to copyright characters and its limitations:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might
so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be
enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to
the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amo-
rous of his mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the
play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Dar-




In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,"5 the district court held
that the plaintiff's cartoon characters were protectable components of a
copyrighted work. The court emphasized that "the various drawings of
each character have a consistency that gives each character a recognizable
image quite apart from the setting of the particular panel."1 e The court
of appeals affirmed,'15 distinguishing between literary and cartoon char-
acters. Nevertheless, the distinctiveness and definition of the characters
were essential to their protectability.
In Sid & Marty Kroffts Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp.,"'8 the court clearly explained that the idea-expression distinction
was the central issue for determining scope of protection. The defendants'
television commercials and promotional products portraying a fantasy-
land with "fanciful costumed characters" infringed the plaintiffs' copy-
right for their television series which also portrayed costumed characters
in a fantasyland.' 59 The court noted that the "boilerplate" test for in-
fringement, "ownership [of valid copyright], access, and substantial simi-
larity,"1 60 does not adequately explain the real issues and the way in
which they are resolved. The idea-expression dichotomy "attempts to rec-
oncile two competing social interests: rewarding an individual's creativity
and effort and permitting the nation to enjoy the benefits and progress
from use of the same subject matter." '
The court articulated two components in the "substantial similarity"
requirement. It termed the first component, a test for substantial similar-
ity of ideas in the copyrighted and allegedly infringing work, an "extrinsic
test. It is extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the trier of
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed ...
[Alnalytic dissection and expert testimony are appropriate. 1' 6 2 Determi-
nation of substantial similarity of expressions requires an "intrinsic" test:
whether an ordinary observer would perceive the allegedly infringing
work as appropriating the expression of the copyrighted work. The ordi-
nary-observer test includes the characteristics of the target audience, in
this instance children. The test is one for the trier of fact and "analytic
'55 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (infringement of
Mickey Mouse characters in a work claimed to be a parody).
156 Id. at 109.
187 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
158 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
,6 Id. at 1161. The series involved was "H.R. Pufnstuf," a children's program.
"McDonaldland" was featured in the commercials. At the time, plaintiff's show was the
most popular children's show on television. The characters were licensed for commercials
and promotional products. The issue of the defendants' access to the plaintiff's work was
not in dispute.
110 Id. at 1162.
161 Id. at 1163.
"I Id. at 1164. According to the court, the "question may often be decided as a matter of
law." Id.
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dissection and expert testimony are not appropriate." 63 The distinction
is essentially the same as one made by other courts between "copying"
and "unlawful appropriation.'1 4 Substantial similarity is important be-
cause copying usually can be inferred only from the fact that the defen-
dant had access to the plaintiff's work and that the two works are so
similar that it is unlikely that the defendant created his work. In this
context, expert testimony and analysis of the differences between the
works may be useful in establishing the likelihood that the defendant's
work is not original.'" However, the second question of whether the ap-
propriation was unlawful turns on whether the defendant used the plain-
tiff's protected expressions. Once it is determined that the differences are
insufficient to negate an inference of copying, the focus shifts to the na-
ture of the similarities. The similarities are to be judged by viewing each
work as a whole, allowing for the subjective quality of the combination of
elements. The question of whether the copy exceeded the bounds of ma-
terial in the public domain is essentially one of policy and is therefore one
for the trier of fact.1 6
6
Nevertheless, there are a few gaps in the Kroffts court's analysis. First,
it is not clear that the first prong of the test is only that of substantial
similarity of ideas, particularly if the test is equated with proof of copy-
ing. The ideas used in two works could be nearly identical; however, even
if access were shown, an inference of copying would not necessarily be
justified. For example, there are no doubt countless painters and sculp-
tors who have portrayed a madonna and child, most of whom probably
had "access" to their predecessors. To infer that the later artist copied
the earlier because he had access and the idea was the same stretches the
meaning of copying. Surely in such an instance, more similarity than
mere identity of ideas would be necessary.
Furthermore, while the court made clear that it is the ordinary ob-
server who decides whether the expression in the two works is substan-
tially similar, it did not provide a more definitive guideline as to where
ideas stop and expressions begin. While the court is probably correct that
the issue should be one for the factfinder, the question becomes one of
balancing the competing policies of copyright and, as with negligence,
165 Id.
Id. (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947)).
16 Compare this concept to negligence law, where expert testimony may be useful in de-
termining that the defendant's conduct actually or factually caused the plaintiff's injuries.
14 Compare the second issue to that of negligent conduct or duty and breach of duty in
negligence law, a question which is almost exclusively one for the trier of fact. Also analo-
gous is the question of proximate causation as opposed to factual causation. Both the stan-
dard of care and proximate cause are policy-based tests determined by the factfinder. Ex-
pert testimony is needed only where a standard of care different from the reasonably-




such balancing of policies should be a question of fact, not law. The pro-
cess of finding infringement may not be so clear where the copies of the
works are not so easily "observable," perhaps a problem emerging since
the 1976 Act abolished the requirement of human-readability. Some areas
of unlawful appropriation may require expert testimony, just as some ar-
eas of negligence law require expert testimony to establish the applicable
standard of care. 1
7
IV. COPYRIGHT FOR VIDEO GAMES
Two aspects of video games have been the subject of copyright. Authors
of video games (or their assignees) have sought copyright protection for
the computer programs which control the games and for the audiovisual
display or "sights and sounds" of the games. Interpretation of copyright
law in the subject areas of characters, games, and computer programs has
proven important in video game litigation. Most of the reported cases are
dispositions of motions for preliminary injunctions, and in most instances
the preliminary injunction has been granted.16 8 The importance of grant-
ing preliminary injunctions in litigation over video game copyright in-
fringement should not be underestimated. Individual video games enjoy a
rather short-lived or at least unpredictable span of popularity." Thus, a
preliminary injunction may be the only means of relief, because the
"game may fade from the scene before the final rights of the parties are
adjudicated.' 7 0
A. The Issues Raised
Two major issues have arisen in recent litigation over video game copy-
117 One such area may be that of object programs for computers.
" Preliminary injunctions were granted in Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer
Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982);
Stern Elecs, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564
F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125
(D.N.J. 1982); Nitendo of Am., Inc. v. Bay Coin Distribs., Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
(1982 Copyright L. Decs.) T 25,409 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981). A permanent injunction was
granted in Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). Preliminary
injunctive relief was denied in Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (involving combination rolling ball/video-arcade games); Atari v. Williams, 2
COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) (1982 Copyright L. Decs.) 25,412 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1981);
Atari v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
"' See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-
America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 154 (D.N.J. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543
F. Supp. 466, 484 (D. Neb. 1981).
170 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 154 (D.N.J. 1982). See
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 484 (D. Neb. 1981).
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right: 1) whether the works are fixed; and 2) what constitutes infringe-
ment, in terms of the scope of the author's rights. A few minor issues
have arisen, including whether it is necessary that the underlying pro-
gram be copyrighted and not merely the display 71 and whether either the
programs or the games are copyrightable at all.
1. Susceptibility to Copyright Generally
The courts have analyzed the copyrightability of video games in the
same manner as games in general. That games as such may not be pro-
tected by copyright was noted in Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips
Consumer Electronics, Inc."" The court, however, acknowledged Profes-
sor Nimmer's view that some aspects of games involving artistic expres-
sion such as game boards are probably copyrightable.7 7 Furthermore, the
issue which is raised vis-h-vis games is more properly one of scope of pro-
tection rather than the susceptibility to copyright per se, because what is
precluded from protection is the idea of a game, including the rules which
define that idea. In principle, all expressive aspects of a game are copy-
rightable. This fact has been recognized in the video game cases despite
the defendants' challenges to the copyrightability of the games.'" The
courts have properly framed the issues as to what aspects of the game are
expressive and to what degree the expressive aspects have been infringed.
In video game cases the susceptibility to copyright of the underlying
computer programs embodied in ROMs inside the game cabinet (or car-
tridge) has not been extensively litigated. In most cases it appears that
the plaintiffs have chosen to register copyright only in the audiovisual
display. This may be because it is the specific game display which sells
the game and is likely to be the subject of misappropriation. Additionally,
while the problem of program piracy is important because of the large
cost of program development and the relative ease with which ROM chips
may be copied, any copy of an author's program, without substantial al-
teration, is likely to produce, and thus infringe, the sights and sounds of
the original work. Accordingly, protection of the audiovisual display is
.. The issue of whether it is necessary to register the program will not be discussed in
detail. In three cases courts have held that it was unnecessary that the copyright be regis-
tered in order for the program to sustain an action for infringement of the audiovisual dis-
play: Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amuse-
ment World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider,
543 F. Supp. 466, 481 (D. Neb. 1981).
'" 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
" 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 2.18[H][3], at 2-212. See supra text accompanying note
84.
" See Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., Inc. 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 547 F. Supp.
999, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-




likely to discourage copying of the underlying program. However, where
the program embodies expressions requiring a great amount of creative
effort; where these expressions can be appropriated for use in games with
little effort; and where the appropriated audiovisual display will not in-
fringe the original, copyright protection for the programs as well as the
display is probably desirable. Illustrative of the need for dual protection
is Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon,175 where the defendants' modi-
fication kits for the plaintiff's PAC-MAN game were found to infringe the
copyright in the underlying programs but not in the audiovisual dis-
play.1 76 The court found that the audiovisual work and the computer pro-
grams were not "intertwined," but rather "distinct creation[s]," 7 7 and
separately susceptible of copyright. Finding that a substantial portion of
the two programs were identical 7 8 and that there were "virtually an infi-
nite number of ways to write [the] program,' ' 7 9 the court concluded that
infringement of the program copyright had occurred.180
The issue of copyright protection of programs embodied in ROMs was
raised in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.'81 The
defendant argued that ROMs were not "copies" of the programs but
rather part of the machine and that consequently, loading the plaintiff's
program into ROMs was not an infringement. The defendant cited the
reasoning of the district court in Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A
Group, Inc. 8 The Williams court, however, rejected that reasoning and
followed Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,"'5 finding that
17 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
178 The defendants produced and sold ROMs that would replace some of the ROMs in the
PAC-MAN circuit board. The replacement ROMs would speed up and change certain as-
pects of the play of the game. Additionally, the purchasers of the modification kits were
instructed to disconnect the sound and remove a ROM which controlled the appearance of
the characters from the PAC-MAN circuit board so that the game as modified did not ap-
pear or sound like PAC-MAN. The court declined to hold that the defendants were contrib-
utory infringers although it was likely that a game owner would fail to remove the ROM
controlling the characters and would thus offer the game as a more difficult version of PAC-
MAN. Id. at 747-48.
17 Id. at 749.
178 Id. at 752.
'~' Id. at 753.
'8o The finding of substantial similarity was based in part on expert testimony. The ques-
tion arises as to the proper method of proof of infringement in computer-program copyright
actions in light of the "ordinary observer" test commonly used. See further the discussion of
Sid & Marty Kroffts Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977), supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text. Expert testimony may be appropriate in
program-infringement actions because the "ordinary observer" is one versed in computer
programming.
'8' 685 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1982).
182 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. 11. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980). Recall the discussion of Data Cash Systems and Tandy, supra notes 85-105 and
accompanying text.
"" 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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under the 1976 Act "Congress opted for an expansive interpretation of
the terms 'fixation' and 'copy' which encompass technological advances
such as those represented by the electronic devices in this case."' 8' The
court refused to provide a loophole whereby programs on ROM chips
could be pirated simply by copying the ROM directly and not copying the
text. 85 Similarly, the court in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon"'8
rejected the arguments that the 1976 Act and 1980 amendments did not
apply to object programs and that copyright ought not to apply to
ROMs.18 7 Although the plaintiff had not registered a program copyright,
the issue of whether ROMs were copies of the audiovisual work was
raised in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.'8 The
issue was not susceptibility to copyright, but rather whether the defen-
dant's sale of speed-up-kit circuit boards infringed any of the plaintiff's
exclusive rights in its audiovisual work. 89 The Midway court also refused
to adopt the Data Cash approach, that ROMs could not be copies, and
instead followed Tandy, finding that ROMs are clearly copies within the
meaning of the 1976 Act. 90 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that
the 1976 Act was properly applied to determine that ROMs were "copies"
of the programs, even prior to the 1980 amendments.' 9 '
Although the copyrightability of programs per se has not been the pri-
mary issue in video game litigation, the status of ROMs as copies in
which the work is fixed and through which the work can be infringed is a
particularly important issue. Despite some uncertainty with respect to
copyright for computer programs under the 1976 Act, the courts to date
have adopted what seems to be the more reasonable and probably the
only correct approach given Congress' clear language and express intent
in passing the 1976 Act.
11 685 F.2d at 877 (footnotes omitted).
's Williams was decided 3 days after the district court decision in Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See supra notes 107-18 and
accompanying text. The court of appeals decision in Williams immediately cast doubt on
the validity of the district court opinion in Apple v. Franklin. In August, 1983, the Third
Circuit confirmed that the district court had been in error. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
'" 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
187 Id. at 749-52. This case was decided prior to the court of appeals decision in Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), and thus in the
midst of the relative confusion in judicial interpretation of the applicability of copyright law
to object programs encoded on ROMs.
' 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). Note that the
defendant was the same as in the Williams case.
,' The speed-up kit causes the game to play faster, making it more difficult. As a result,
the commercial game owner generates more revenue because players tend to play a shorter
time for each coin inserted.
547 F. Supp. at 1012-13.





In several of the copyright infringement suits the defendants have
claimed that the plaintiffs' works are not protected because they fail to
satisfy the statutory requirement of fixation." 2 It is argued that the work
is not fixed because every time the game is played the interaction with
the player makes it a different work expressed only in evanescent
images.' 93 However, the courts have invariably found no merit in this ar-
gument. 9" Some courts have reasoned that many of the audiovisual fea-
tures of the game are repeated each time the game is played, and that in
any event the "attract mode," in which a sequence demonstrates the
game before it is played, is always the same.0 5
The analysis is unnecessary. The entire expression of the author is
fixed in the microcircuits of the game when it is produced. That expres-
sion includes the statements and their ordering embodied in the program,
and the characters and their "antics," the auditory effects, and the inter-
action of elements embodied in the audiovisual display. Furthermore,
one court has noted that "the images generated by the character ROMs
move on the screen in a finite but enormous number of sequences."' "
Notwithstanding that the display appears to be different every time the
game is played, the sequence of images for each configuration produced
by the player is fixed and predetermined in the game's circuits. In a sense
the player could be viewed as part of the "machine or device" with the
aid of which the work is "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
' Recall that an original work of authorship is copyrighted when it is "fixed," as that
event triggers federal statutory rights under the provision of 17 U.S.C. app. § 301 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). As defined in § 101, "[a] work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory du-
ration." The Act further defines "copies" as
material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device . . . [and]
includes the material object ... in which the work is first fixed.
17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
113 This contention has also been argued to negate the originality requirement, the claim
being that the player co-authors a new work each time the game is played. See Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856
(2d Cir. 1982).
I" Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc. 704 F.2d at 1011-12; Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d at 874; Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 856; Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. 11. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp.
466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981).
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d at 874; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 1008.
'" Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 1002.
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cated" under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the 1976 Act. Al-
ternatively the play of a video game may be viewed as
a little like arranging words in a dictionary into sentences or
paints on a palette into a painting. The question is whether the
creative effort in playing a video game is enough like writing or
painting to make each performance of a video game the work of
the player and not the game's [author]. 197
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held otherwise, comparing
playing a video game to changing channels on a television, because "[t]he
player . . . [has no] control over the sequence of images that appears on
the . . . screen, ' ' but rather selects from the few sequences stored in
the circuits."'
Whether the work is fixed also depends on what is defined as "the
work." Clearly the program, as a work of authorship, is fixed. But the
"audiovisual work '20 0 need not be defined as an entirely fixed sequence of
sights and sounds which reappear every time the game is activated. 01
The definitional phrase "series of related images 20 2 could be so con-
strued. However, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a broader construction
of the statute as "refer[ring] to any set of images displayed as some kind
of unit, '20 3 noting that the legislative history suggests that the act should
be interpreted flexibly so as to encompass new technologies. 20 4 The audio-
visual work comprises the visual representations of the characters, their
movements, the sounds produced, and the way the elements interact. All
of these game aspects are permanently fixed in the memory boards.
Moreover, "the copyright [is not] defeated because the audiovisual work
and the computer program are both embodied in the same components of
the game.
20 1
'97 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc. 704 F.2d at 1011.
198 Id. at 1012.
I It is interesting to note that one reason the popularity of a particular game declines
rapidly is that the game sequences tend to be repetitive. Once a player finds a technique to
master a game, the player will often play the same sequence every time because it is success-
ful. Maze games like PAC-MAN are particularly susceptible to this phenomenon.
'" Some courts have stated that the work must fall into one of the statutory categories
and have described the games as audiovisual works. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Neb. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466,
479 (D. Neb. 1981). This is not a requirement of the statute. The categories stated in
17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) are not all-inclusive.
201 Audiovisual works are defined in the 1976 Act as "works that consist of a series of
related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or de-
vices such as ... electronic equipment. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
202 Id.
'03 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d at 1011.
'" Id. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
205 Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 856. The court found analogous the fact that a




It is clear that video games are not works the nature of which Congress
envisioned would be outside the scope of the Act when it articulated the
fixation requirement. As discussed by the district court in Midway Man-
ufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.: "'[Plurely evanescent or tran-
sient reproductions' referred to by Congress are those arising from live
telecasts or performances that are nowhere separately recorded. Clearly
the lack of any recording of such events would preclude their ever again
being identically reproduced. 20 Furthermore, the scope of works which
should be considered not to be fixed within the meaning of the 1976 Act
is quite narrow, given Congress' intent to preempt virtually all common-
law copyright by enacting section 301.07
3. Infringement
While some video game cases have centered around the issue of
whether the statutory requirements for copyright have been met, others
have focused on issues of infringement and the scope of protection to be
accorded a given game. The courts have followed the general approach
articulated in Sid & Marty Kroffts Television Productions, Inc. v. Mc-
Donald's Corp.20 8 In most cases the issue of copying has been easily re-
solved. Access was a virtual certainty, given the wide distribution and
popularity of the games involved. Substantial similarity to prove copying
was easily shown where the games were nearly identical.2 09 The primary
issue has been whether there was unlawful appropriation of the plaintiff's
games. The courts have applied the "ordinary observer" test and have
focused on what aspects of the audiovisual display constitute the author's
expression and are not merely the inevitable consequence of the ideas
involved.
The best articulation of this analysis is in Atari, Inc. v. North Ameri-
can Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.2 10 Atari involved a claim of in-
fringement of the copyright for the plaintiffs' PAC-MAN game, "a maze-
chase game in which the player scores points by guiding a central figure
through various passageways of a maze and at the same time avoiding
collision with certain opponents . . . which move independently about
the maze. 2 11 In its analysis of the idea-expression dichotomy, the court
described an approach sometimes used regarding copyright in literary
An alternate analogy is to a motion picture, which embodies both the screenplay and the
works of the director, cinematographer, and film editors.
'" 547 F. Supp. at 1008.
1 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
208 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982)
(partial summary judgment granted on the issues of access and substantial similarity in an
action involving PAC-MAN and Galaxian).
0 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. __, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
.. Id. at 617. The defendant's game was entitled "K.C. Munchkin."
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works. The approach attempts to distinguish scenes d faire from the ex-
pressive elements of the work. "Scdnes a faire refers to 'incidents, charac-
ters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least
standard, in the treatment of a given topic.' "1 Sc~nes & faire are not
part of the author's expression and thus not protected (except perhaps
from identical copying). The court noted that the scope of protection of
the works will be directly related to the degree "[to] which fairly complex
or fanciful artistic expressions predominate over relatively simplistic
themes and which are almost entirely products of the author's creativity
rather than concomitants of those themes." ''1 The Atari court then at-
tempted to discern those elements of the plaintiffs' audiovisual work
which were protectable before turning to the issue of whether the ordi-
nary observer would find those elements of the two games to be substan-
tially similar.
Applying the analysis to the games before it, the court found the maze,
scoring table, use of dots, and tunnel exits in the two games to be scnes
a faire. The characters, however, were found to distinguish PAC-MAN
from other games with similar ideas and to be "wholly fanciful creations."
The size, shape, and manner of movement were protectable expressions.
Additionally, the method by which the role-reversal process of the game
was expressed was protectable2 "
In applying the ordinary-observer test to the two games, the court, as
in Kroffts, looked to the overall similarities and not the specific differ-
ences between the two works. Differences are only important, according
to the court, insofar as they "influenced the impressions of the ordinary
observer. '21 5 Further, the specific audience to whom the work was di-
rected was considered in applying the ordinary-observer test, as suggested
by the analysis of Kroffts. The test used demands substantial similarity
in "the total concept and feel"21 6 of the protectable elements of the two
works from the standpoint of the ordinary observer to whom the work is
directed. Thus, the court found that the facts presented a reasonable
probability of success at trial on the merits.2 1 7
Other courts have found a reasonable probability of unlawful appropri-
ation on the particular facts of the cases before them. Two such cases also
involved claims of infringement on PAC-MAN, as well as on a game
called "Galaxian," which is a space-battle game in which the player fights
off a squadron of insect-shaped aliens, some of which peel off in smaller
formations to attack the player's ship.2"8 Other games have been found to
... Id. at 616 (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
672 F.2d at 617.
.. Id. at 618.
215 Id.
"' Id. at 620.
117 The case was reviewed on motion for preliminary injunction.




contain protectable expressions. Preliminary injunctions have been issued
to halt infringement of games such as Scramble, where a player's space-
ship moves horizontally through different scenes, encountering obstacles
and attempting to destroy his enemy's installations while fighting off at-
tacks,2 19 and Donkey Kong, in which the player attempts to move a man
through a series of obstacles up a structure to save a women from a gorilla
at the top.2 20 The expressions found to be protectable include the distinc-
tive visual representations of the characters and scene, the antics of the
characters, the sound effects, especially musical themes, and specifically,
aspects of the interactions among the characters. Additionally, substan-
tial similarity has been found notwithstanding the fact that differences in
media may restrict the degree to which the works can be similar, as where
an arcade video game has been copied by a hand-held electronic game
version.2 21
No infringement has been found under the same substantial-similarity
standard where the copied elements of the game have been deemed
scnes 6 faire and where the expressive elements were not deemed to be
sufficiently similar. In Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc. 2 22 the plain-
tiffs game, Asteroids, was allegedly infringed by the defendant's game,
Meteors. While the court found the plaintiff to have a valid copyright and
found that the defendant had probably copied the plaintiff's game, the
elements which were copied were really scnes & faire. Since those ele-
ments were not copied identically there could be no infringement. The
analysis implies that where sc~nes e faire are involved it may be appro-
priate to view the differences between the works to determine if there is
identical copying. The court found that there were "certain forms of ex-
pression that one must necessarily use in designing a video game in which
a player fights his way through space rocks and enemy spaceships," and
that those forms "account[ed] for most of the similarities" between the
games.2 22
court found a reasonable probability of success on the merits as to unlawful appropriation of
both games. The court refused to grant summary judgment on that issue, finding it to be a
jury question. No preliminary injunction was granted for Galaxian because no irreparable
injury to the plaintiff was shown, as it no longer sold the game. In Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981), preliminary injunctions were issued
against the defendants for their counterparts to PAC-MAN, Galaxian, and Raly-X (a maze-
chase game involving cars).
,' Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
,2 Nitendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Nitendo of Am., Inc. v. Bay Coin Distribs., Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. RaP. (CCH) (1982 Copy-
right L. Decs.) 25,409 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1982).
.. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
'2 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
I2' d. at 229. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ill.
1983). Williams involved a claim that the defendant's combination rolling ball/video-arcade
game infringed the plaintiff's copyrighted game. The court found the fact that the games
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No infringement was found by the court in litigation involving PAC-
MAN in Atari, Inc. v. Williams.2 24 Although the court acknowledged the
protectable elements in the game, the defendant's game, Jawbreaker, was
held not to contain substantially similar expressions in its use of a set of
teeth instead of the PAC-MAN "gobbler" and smiling faces instead of the
"ghost monsters" found in the PAC-MAN game. In the final analysis, the
delineation between idea and expression and findings regarding substan-
tial similarity are policy-based decisions.
B. Policy Considerations
While the courts' language and the specific factual settings of the cases
provide some guidance for the line-drawing mandated by the idea-expres-
sion distinction, the line-drawing inevitably rests on policy grounds. This
is true whether the dichotomy between idea and expression is raised on
issues of proper subject matter or on scope of protection afforded by
copyright in a particular work. The distinction will usually come into play
in questions concerning the scope of protection, because excluding a work
entirely on the basis that the subject matter is not copyrightable tends to
foreclose future protection for that type of work. Allowing some copyright
protection, but greatly limiting its scope in works in which the idea and
the expression are nearly the same, allows for more flexibility in future
cases involving similar subject matter.2 2
Implicit in the copyright clause and the Copyright Act is a policy "to
encourage individual effort and creativity by granting valuable enforcea-
ble rights. 226 The idea-expression dichotomy embodies a balancing of the
conflicting policies of rewarding individual efforts and allowing free ac-
cess to knowledge and ideas. The desired outcome of that balance is a
system which "promote[s] the progress of Science" 22 7-that is, fosters the
productivity of authors. Free public use of ideas is essential to that end,
so that an author may enjoy only a limited monopoly which will not block
others from the use of the raw materials of authorship-ideas. The idea-
expression boundary is defined by the rather tautological policy decision
were of the same type to be irrelevant. All of the elements which the games had in common
were scenes a faire, or "common to virtually all pinball and video games." Id. at 1278. The
unprotectable elements were those which had "no conceptual significance apart from the
role they play[ed] in the mechanical operation of the game." Id. at 1280-81.
224 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) (1982 Copyright L. Decs.) T 25,412 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28,
1981).
"' See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971)
(jewelled "bee" pin could only be protected from virtually identical copying because the
idea and expression are indistinguishable).
'26 Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, - U.S. - , 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982). Alternatively, copyright may be viewed
as securing an author's property interest in his original expression.




that "ideas" are those aspects of a work which, if monopolized, will block
too much. The line is drawn wherever it appears that the balance favors
the reward of only a single author, and further individual effort and crea-
tivity can no longer be fostered.
In the video game industry, it is the games' lucrative marketability
which ultimately encourages their development. However, original video
game development entails a large investment in dollars and in creative
effort.2 2 8 Given the availability of mechanical means for and ease of copy-
ing the games, a video game designer may make that large investment
only to have it pirated at very little cost. Copyright protection for video
games is appropriate in light of the fact that "writings" are involved in
both the audiovisual displays and in the underlying computer programs.
Copyright is also ideally suited to encouraging development of games by
providing for a balance between the reward of individual efforts and the
maintenance of the free use of ideas. The free use of ideas is particularly
important given the relatively short-lived popularity of individual games.
Without some form of protection, however, there would be virtually no
incentive to bear the high cost of development of new games. Further-
more, trade secret, misappropriation, and other common-law forms of
protection may be unavailable for video games. At least one court has
found state common-law doctrines of misappropriation and trade secret
to be preempted by the Copyright Act insofar as property interests in
video games were concerned.2 2 9
There are two aspects of a video game which contribute to its marketa-
bility. First, the type of game and the rules of play involved are impor-
tant. It must be challenging, interesting, and yet playable. 23 But the spe-
cific audiovisual characteristics of the game will contribute to its
popularity as well. The graphic representations,2 3 1 the characters, their
antics, and the sound effects are what make a game distinctive and may
cause players to choose it over others. The type of game and the rules and
procedure of play will generally be non-protectable ideas. To some de-
gree, those aspects of a game may be protected by the copyright in the
underlying program, since piracy of the program is probably a common
form of copying, especially with very complex games. On the other hand,
many aspects of the audiovisual display will be protectable expressions.
The more creative and distinctive the audiovisual display is, the greater
the scope of protection which inheres in its copyright because more as-
pects are likely to be viewed as expression rather than ideas.
Such an application of copyright law to video games, it would seem, is
2. For a discussion of the techniques involved in game design and the author's view that
"game design is an art form" see Crawford, supra note 5, at 96.
2" Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476-77 (D. Nev. 1983).
o Crawford, supra note 5, at 96.
231 Id.
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desirable. There are many ways to express a given game concept. For ex-
ample, several games utilize a maze-chase concept. "3 ' Several have used
the theme of a character's climbing a structure while encountering obsta-
cles and fending off opponents. 3 In all of these instances the same game
concept has been used, yet completely different characters, visual effects,
and sound effects are presented. As long as the ideas remain available to
game designers, there will be ample opportunity for the development of
new games. This is presumably essential in an industry where an individ-
ual game enjoys fleeting popularity. It appears that copyright law, as it
has been applied to video games, and with a special emphasis on a bal-
ancing of policies given the facts of individual cases, is an acceptable ve-
hicle for protecting an author's interest in his games.
V. CONCLUSION
The need for some form of protection from copying for video games is
clear. Copyright appears to fulfill that need without exceeding the bounds
of the policies implicit in both the Constitution and in our economic sys-
tem of extending at most only limited monopolies. Furthermore, video
games are clearly within the realm of subject matter and media that Con-
gress intended to protect in its 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, both
as audiovisual works and as computer programs. The principles of copy-
right law provide adequate limits on the scope of protection to be af-
forded a work, primarily through the idea-expression dichotomy. The bal-
ance which has been achieved by the courts in video game litigation to
date seems adequate to promote the underlying policies involved.
The single area which was problematic was the courts' interpretation of
copyright law with respect to computer programs in machine form. De-
spite the clear intent of the 1976 Act, confusion persisted until recently.
Another aspect of computer-program copyright, in the midst of the con-
fusion, has not been addressed. Assuming the availability of copyright for
machine programs, what standard is to be applied in ascertaining where
infringement has occurred? Who is "the ordinary observer?" Perhaps the
ordinary observer should, as in the cases of characters and games, take on
the characteristics of the audience to whom the work is directed. Expert
opinion may be necessary to ascertain infringement in this area.
The uncertain status of computer programs has not proved fatal to
video game copyright because authors have generally relied on copyright
in the audiovisual display. However, the problem of program piracy has
in some instances made a copyright in the program essential. Moreover,
the best protection for a video game will be achieved where both the dis-
play and the program are copyrighted. Video game developers should,
132 Some examples are PAC-MAN, Rally-X, and Take the Money and Run as variants of
this theme.
233 Some examples are Donkey-Kong, Climber, and Amidar.
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however, be cognizant of the fact that their works will, in the final analy-
sis, be protected only to the degree to which they embody distinctive and
original expressions and not merely simple game ideas.
MARY PATRICIA CULLER
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